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The Fight For Power In Libya

Author: Kevin Ivey

July 30 2019

Haftar's LNA may not be as strong as it appears

In April, Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) launched an
attack on the U.N.-backed Government of National Accord (GNA)
in Tripoli. The operation came after the LNA, loyal to the rival
government in Tobruk, spent 2018 taking control of southern and
eastern Libya. In this July 29 photo, a GNA sniper takes aim during
clashes with LNA forces in the Salah al-Din district south of Tripoli.

Following the ouster of Muammar Qaddafi in 2011, Libya emerged as a top concern for security analysts and defense policymakers. The North African country became a source of several potential threats: weapons proliferation, human-trafficking, terrorism, a failed state and general instability. After eight years of conflict, these concerns remain valid.

 

Despite the international attention that Libya has received, particularly regarding the tragic loss of Ambassador Chris Stevens in September 2012, the conflict continues to be poorly understood. The shifting alliances of local militias, limited international news coverage and a legacy of isolation have contributed to one-dimensional portrayals that emphasize a two-sided conflict and imminent threat of state collapse. A more accurate framework is needed that accommodates the interplay of the various militias as well as the role of foreign backers.

 

Fall of Qaddafi

The period immediately after Qaddafi's fall was chaotic. Nevertheless, early efforts to establish a replacement government met with some success. A transitional government known as the National Transitional Council ruled until mid-2012, when it handed power to the elected General National Congress (GNC). Neither government, however, was able to effectively guarantee security and the rule of law. In the capital, Tripoli, militias became de facto police and security forces, even kidnapping Prime Minister Ali Zeidan in October 2013. Efforts to establish security often resulted in paying militias not to fight or recognizing them as legitimate forces. The political divisions that resulted in the establishment of the rival House of Representatives (HoR) in 2014 exacerbated the situation. (The legislative body was elected in June 2014, but the Supreme Constitutional Court in Tripoli later declared that the voting was unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives should be dissolved. The HoR rejected the ruling, saying it was issued "at gunpoint" since the capital was controlled by illegitimate militias at the time.)

 

As extremists emerged in several cities, including Benghazi and Derna, and concerns grew about state failure, Khalifa Haftar emerged as a major political force. The former general lived in exile following a failed coup attempt in the 1980s and had only recently returned to Libya. Presenting himself as the strong hand needed to bring order, Haftar, at the head of local militias, launched Operation Dignity in May 2014 in an effort to push extremist groups and militias out of towns in eastern Libya. The commander aligned himself with the Tobruk-based HoR (formerly based in Benghazi) and called his forces the Libyan National Army (LNA). The Tobruk-based government formally appointed Haftar as the commander of its forces in March 2015. Since then, the LNA has gradually expanded its control in eastern and southern Libya, including significant advances in 2018.

 

On April 4, 2019, Haftar ordered his forces to march on Tripoli and the U.N.-backed government there. Seizing the capital would consolidate his territorial control over most of the country and, in theory, stabilize the situation.

 

The Libyan National Army

Haftar has sought to portray the LNA as a legitimate military. The force contains some units and weapons from the pre-Qaddafi era, including the Libyan Special Forces, sometimes called the Lightning Forces, as well as significant elements of the former air force. According to some estimates, the LNA may have as many as 7,000 professional soldiers, out of a total strength of around 25,000 fighters.

 

The LNA's ranks also include an array of less-professional units, including individual militias opposed to the GNA and adherents of the ultra-conservative Salafi and Madkhali Sunni Muslim movements, such as the Tariq Ibn Ziyad brigade. Haftar has also allegedly employed Chadian and Sudanese rebel groups to maintain control, particularly in remote southern regions.

 

Haftar's ability to control these units is difficult to assess. Relegating militias to the periphery may indicate concerns about their loyalty or fighting ability. When the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Lightning Forces commander Mahmoud Werfelli for allegedly killing prisoners, the special operations leader proved popular (or influential) enough to spring himself from jail shortly thereafter. Reports vary, but it appeared that Haftar was involved at some level. Some Libyan sources initially said that Haftar released him to prevent fighting among LNA factions.

 

According to Barah Mikail, the director of Stractegia Consulting and an associate professor at Saint Louis University in Madrid, Haftar's influence on units within the LNA varies, but is generally stronger than that of his rivals.

 

At the same time, the LNA suffered significant losses as it fought to expand its control. Despite the gains on paper, municipalities have been slow to join, he told Military Periscope. Some advances have come at the cost of former allies, such as the Awaguir tribe, slowing efforts to grow the force.

 

GNA Forces

Standing against Haftar is a group of at least eight militias in northwestern Libya, concentrated around Tripoli and Misrata. This includes the Tripoli Protection Force, a merger of the four largest militias in the capital that was formed in December 2018. A number of former enemies of the U.N.-backed government, such as the Steadfastness Front led by Salah Badi, are also fighting against the LNA. The participation of Badi, who was sanctioned by the Treasury Dept.’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in November 2018, is likely to do little to quiet concerns regarding the militias backing the GNA.

 

Groups supporting the GNA are broadly organized under Operation Volcano of Rage, nominally led by the government. As might be expected, this is a fragile coalition. Some groups have complained that they receive little in the way of material support from the GNA, forcing them to risk hard-won arms and ammunition with no promise of replacement. A spokesman for the operation declined to comment on these allegations.

 

Both sides have used paid military contractors, including the aforementioned Sudanese groups or combat pilots. This was seen in June, when the LNA captured an enemy pilot who was later revealed to be a U.S. Air Force veteran. Haftar's forces reportedly employed mercenaries to carry out airstrikes, some working for Erik Prince, the founder of the controversial Blackwater private military company, according to reports in 2017. So far, mercenaries appear to play a greater role in the LNA, likely due to the deep pockets of Haftar's backers.

 

Foreign Support

Behind the scenes, several countries have supplied weaponry to Libyan actors in violation of the U.N. arms embargo. Some states, particularly those that back Haftar, have put themselves even closer to the fighting.

 

Supporting Haftar are Egypt, France, Russia and the United Arab Emirates. While none have publicly acknowledged their support and maintain that they are complying with U.N. sanctions, they have provided invaluable aid. In addition to Qaddafi-era tanks, the LNA has acquired Russian-made Pantsyr-S1 air defense systems from the U.A.E. and Mbombe 6 x 6 armored vehicles and Al-Mared 8 x 8 vehicles from Jordan. It may have also received Javelin anti-tank missiles from France, although Paris maintains that missiles found at a base used by Haftar's forces were inert and left over from French special operations personnel who had been deployed to the area. The LNA is also believed to have obtained access to F-16 fighters, although it is not clear if they are in the group's possession or are a capability provided by backers such as the U.A.E.

 

The LNA's allies have also provided intelligence, airstrikes and diplomatic cover. At Al Khadim airbase east of Benghazi, Emirati aircraft have flown in support of Haftar, while Egyptian, Emirati and French intelligence personnel work inside the secure base. After Haftar launched his April 4 attack on Tripoli, a French naval force arrived at the critical Sidra oil terminal, which is controlled by Haftar. In international bodies, Russia and France have frustrated attempts to formally condemn Haftar's advance.

 

For its part, the Emirati government has supplied crucial air support and air defenses. Both Egypt and the U.A.E. have been suspected of conducting air attacks in Libya in support of Haftar. More recently, the Emirati government has hit targets closer to the front lines in Tripoli. These include a July 2 attack on a migrant detention center, which killed at least 42 migrants and was blamed on an Emirati F-16. The U.A.E. has also increasingly used drones, such as Chinese-built Wing Loong IIs. Fragments found after one strike were attributed Chinese Blue Arrow 7 (HJ-10) missiles. Backers of the eastern forces appear to have bet heavily on Haftar.

 

The reasons for this support vary. Haftar's opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood has won him backing from the Egyptian and Emirati governments, both of which view the Brotherhood as a mortal enemy. French backing is likely due to the view that Haftar is the only force capable of stabilizing the country and stemming the flow of human-trafficking and smuggling across the Mediterranean.

 

The GNA has its own foreign support, although much less than that received by the LNA. In addition to the legitimacy provided by U.N. backing, it has received weapons from Turkey, including BMC Kirpi and Vuran armored vehicles that arrived in May. The GNA is also believed to operate an unknown number of Turkish drones, which may have been used in recent airstrikes.

 

Supplies for the GNA arrive through Misrata, says Mikail, citing well-placed sources. "Misrata is the central piece in the GNA's strategy," he said, referencing the central role of the city's militias in the fight. "If it loses Misrata and its militias, it loses it all."

 

Other sources of arms appear to be limited. Qatar, the GNA's other international champion, has publicly opposed weapons shipments to Libya and called on the international community to uphold the arms embargo.

 

Washington has largely limited its statements on Libya. Outside of a surprise announcement of support by President Trump following a phone call with Haftar shortly after the April offensive began, the U.S. has maintained a cautious attitude towards the conflict. Washington's primary concern is to ensure that Libya does not become a breeding ground for terrorism or an international arms depot. At least some American military personnel deployed in Libya have been forced to withdraw due to recent changes in the security environment, which could affect counterterrorism efforts.

 

Cracks in the LNA's Armor

The LNA currently represents the more effective fighting force. It is better armed and has better command and control than the patchwork of forces defending Tripoli. Its allies appear to be more committed.

 

The chasms that exist between the forces backing the GNA are well established. If the forces defending the capital prevail, there are few prospects for power-sharing or unity, something GNA President Fayez Serraj is aware of, says Mikail, the head of Stractegia Consulting.

 

There should be similar doubts about the cohesion of the LNA. Despite the public face of a professional force, its core of regular troops is vastly outnumbered by irregular militias and foreign fighters. Haftar's occasional bungling of tribal politics and sometimes racially-tinged language has already alienated some, including former allies in the Awaguir tribe and members of the southern Tubu community. So far, he has done little to introduce governance to those areas he controls.

 

There are deeper issues as well. He relies on hardline Salafist and Madkhali fighters and his forces have been accused of numerous human-rights abuses, including summary executions and the recent kidnapping of Seham Sergiwa, an HoR member who had criticized Haftar shortly before her abduction from her home in Benghazi.

 

Questions also remain about the capability of Haftar's forces. Despite a significant material advantage and a divided enemy, the LNA has so far failed to take Tripoli and was driven out of Gharyan, a key town south of Tripoli. The LNA now finds its supply lines stretched and is forced to support its fighters near Tripoli from Tarhouna, about 40 miles (65 km) southeast of the capital.

 

***

 

The conflict in Libya has settled into a stalemate. Middle Eastern backers of local forces have been permitted to ship arms to Libya by the European guarantors of the U.N. embargo. The ideological rivalry between Turkey and Qatar on one side and the Emirates and Egypt on the other provides additional fuel for the conflict. With no unified international effort to de-escalate the conflict, it appears that legitimacy can only be obtained by victory on the battlefield.

 

Even if the U.N.-backed government succeeds in pushing back Haftar's forces, this is unlikely to bring unity. A battlefield defeat could leave various groups fighting to grab what they can. New factions that avoided fighting could emerge to pick off weaker rivals. Existing agreements among various militias might have to be renegotiated.

 

Khalifa Haftar has sought to portray himself and the LNA as the kingmakers in Libya. While the LNA is by far the most effective force, it is not invincible. It is also not clear whether he has any vision for Libya after the conflict. Instead of seeking to resolve Libya's problems, he appears poised to endure them. Given the potential weakness of the LNA coalition, it is an open question how patient domestic factions and foreign backers will be if Haftar cannot deliver victory.

Sources:

"The Rise Of Libya’s Renegade General: How Haftar Built His War Machine," Arnaud Delalande, Middle East Eye (London) May 14, 2019; "Addressing The Rise Of Libya’s Madkhali-Salafis," International Crisis Group, April 25, 2019; "Libya’s Foreign Militias," Thomas Howes-Ward, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 10, 2018; "ICC Suspect Al-Werfalli ‘Escapes’ From Prison In Libya," Mohamed Osman, International Justice Monitor, Aug. 7, 2018; "Shifting Alliances In Libya’s Conflict," Lakhdar Ghettas, June 24, 2016; "Who’s Fighting Haftar In Tripoli?" Wolfram Lacher, Small Arms Survey, July 11, 2019; "He Once Attacked Tripoli. Now A Libyan Militia Leader Defends It From Another Invader," Sudarsan Raghavan, Washington Post, July 20, 2019; "Ex-Air Force U.S. ‘Mercenary’ Released By Libyan Militant Captors After Being Held For Six Weeks," Borzou Daraghi and Bel Trew, Independent (London), June 26, 2019; "Erik Prince’s Mercenaries Are Bombing Libya," Arnaud Delalande, War Is Boring, Jan. 14, 2017; "Libya Operating Pantsir-S1 Air Defense Systems," Defence Web (South Africa), June 20, 2019; "Jordanian Armored Vehicles Spotted In Libya," Defence Web, May 28, 2019; "Missiles Found At Base Of Libyan Warlord Are Ours, France Admits," Agence France-Presse, July 10, 2019; "French Forces In Sidr Port In Libya Fearing Counterattack," (translated), Al Jazeera (Qatar), April 22, 2019; " "France’s Military Presence In Libya? 'Un Secret De Polichinelle,' As The French Say," Col. Jacques Neriah, May 7, 2019; "Haftar Force Says It Has Recaptured Key Libyan Oil Ports," France 24, June 21, 2018; "Libya’s Tripoli Government Blames U.A.E. For Deadly Airstrike," Jared Malsin and Amira El-Fekki, Wall Street Journal, July 4, 2019; "Let’s Talk About The Photo Of Chinese-Built 'Wing Loong' Drone (Likely Operated by UAE) Over Libya," Aviationist, Tom Demerly, July 3, 2019; "Forces Loyal To Libya's U.N.-Backed Government Receive Military Hardware," Reuters, May 18, 2019; "Jordanian Armored Vehicles Spotted In Libya," Defence Web, May 28, 2019; "East Libya Forces Take Out Turkish Drone," Reuters, July 1, 2019; "Drone Strike Near Tripoli Kills Seven Fighters Loyal To Haftar," Reuters, July 21, 2019; "Qatar Calls For Arms Embargo Against Libya's Haftar," Reuters, April 16, 2019; "Declining Security In Libya Results In Personnel Relocation, Agility Emphasis," U.S. Africa Command, April 7, 2019; "Libya's HoR Member Says Haftar's Forces Burnt, Looted Over 90 Houses In Murzuq," Abdulkader Assad, Libya Observer, Feb. 24, 2019; "Libya's Tubu Minority Fear Warlord Haftar's Southern Offensive," New Arab, Feb. 22, 2019; "Quiet No More?" Frederic Wehrey, Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, Oct. 13, 2016; "American Family Of Kidnapped Libyan Politician Pleads For Her Return," Linda Givetash, NBC News, July 22, 2019; "Libya's Civil War: Navigating Its Dangerous New Phase," Anas El Gomati, War On The Rocks, July 11, 2019; "Libyan Court Rules Elected Parliament Illegal," Al Jazeera, Nov. 7, 2014; "Khalifa Haftar: Libya's Military Strongman," Chase Winter, Deutsche Welle, April 5, 2019.

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